EXPLORATORY STUDY

on the Current Limitations of
Personal Protective Equipment
and the Potential for Innovation
By Kyaw Lin Htut [ Norwegian People’s Aid ]

P

ersonal protective equipment (PPE) in mine action typically consists of a polycarbonate visor
that fully covers the face and front neck, and body armor consisting of an apron made of aramid
fabric (i.e., Kevlar) that fully covers the front torso, groin, and neck. PPE used in mine action is
generally considered as “the last line of defense” since the primary method through which accidental
deaths and injuries are prevented is through the application of and adherence to appropriate standard
operating procedures (SOPs). However, with any operations, there is always an element of “acceptable
risk,” and universal adherence to all SOPs at all times by all mine action personnel is not realistic. Thus,
the primary purpose of PPE is to minimize harm rather than prevent it. This must be balanced with factors such as weight, mobility, visibility, and to a lesser extent, cost.
In volume 22, issue 1 of this publication, Andy Smith observed
that there has been a lack of progress in PPE development for the
last twenty years. He attributes this to a combination of factors
including
• “Lack of demand.”
• “The current risk is thought tolerable.”
• “More immediate ways to manage risk.”1
Smith further notes that this trend has not been ideal, and that
improvements to PPE technologies and usage should address four
needs, namely
• “reduce the severity of blast injuries…[by adopting]…

Norway to investigate the criteria for and facilitate the development
of the “Next generation of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in
Mine Action and Disarmament.” To that end, this paper expounds
upon Smith’s analysis, further identifying and considering some
of the major limitations in the current generation of PPE typically
used in the mine action sector. This paper explores the technical
limitations of the materials used as well the operational constraints
and in doing so, develops a framework through which next generation PPE suited to mine action operations can be developed.

blast resistant hand-tools”

•

“reduce eye loss…[through]…invention of improved
visor material”

• “increase body protection”
• “allow end-users to compare products”
Furthermore, the current generation of PPE used in mine action
is geared towards threats that were more common in previous
years (i.e., anti-personnel [AP] blast mines). As conflicts, threats,
and mine action activities evolve, for instance with the increasing
use of IEDs and greater emphasis on cluster munitions and other
unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance (particularly in populated
areas), there needs to be periodic review to ensure that the current generation of PPE is “fit for purpose.” As mine action activities
have progressed beyond the clearance of primarily AP mines, the
need for a new generation of PPE becomes apparent as evolving
threats, environmental impact, and gender inclusivity should be
taken into account.
Hoping to further clarify and fulfill these needs in 2021,
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) received a grant from Innovation
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Male NPA deminer in Bosnia and Herzegovina
conducting clearance while wearing aramid body armor
and a polycarbonate visor.
All images courtesy of Norwegian People’s Aid.

High-Velocity Fragmentation Threats
High-velocity fragmentation2 presents a unique challenge in
humanitarian mine action (HMA)3 due to the fact that most
PPE used in HMA is typically not rated to defeat this threat.
According to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 10.304
the minimum standard of body armor must be at least NATO
Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2920 compliant to V50 450
at 1.102 g, meaning that the material must reliably stop 50 percent
of incoming projectiles with a mass of up to 1.102 g travelling at 450
m/s. IMAS 10.30 does not specify that visors need to be STANAG
2920 rated, only that “the eye protection shall be capable of retaining integrity against the blast effects of 240 g of TNT at 60 cm
and shall provide protection equivalent to not less than 5 mm of
untreated polycarbonate” (IMAS 10.30, 2013).5 With this in mind,
however, it must be noted that the PPE used in HMA is primarily
intended to mitigate the effects of secondary fragmentation6 from
AP blast mines rather than high-velocity fragmentation. Although
the technology to defeat high-velocity (i.e., rifle) projectiles widely
exists in the form of ceramic-composite or high-hardness steel, the
significant added weight, loss of flexibility, and bulk (some plates
are as thick as 25 mm) for a limited coverage area and high cost
of procurement are significant drawbacks to widespread adoption.
Although large caliber ordnance such as artillery shells produce
high-velocity fragmentation,7 this paper will only refer to smaller
AP items such as cluster munitions, grenades, and AP fragmentation mines encountered during HMA operations. The reason for
excluding larger caliber items is that the probability of survival of
a point blank (i.e., within 1 m) detonation of a large caliber projectile (with more than 1 kg of high explosive) is virtually zero,
while survival of a point blank detonation of smaller items such
as AP fragmentation mines, grenades, or cluster munitions have
been extensively documented by NPA and the mine action sector
as a whole.
Using this criteria, there have been in total fourteen highvelocity fragmentation accidents involving cluster munitions, AP
fragmentation mines, and grenades resulting in sixteen casualties
documented in NPA’s database from January 1994 to April 2020.
These accidents have resulted in the deaths of eight victims and
non-fatal injuries to eight survivors. Of the eight fatalities, five8
were not wearing any torso PPE (i.e., body armor) or facial PPE
(i.e., visor) and all five received fatal penetrative injuries to the
torso as well as fatal head injuries from high-velocity fragmentation. Of the three fatalities who were wearing body armor, two of
the victims had parts of their body armor compromised, while one
did not have their body armor compromised and received no torso
injuries (the victim received penetrative head injuries). Of the two
fatalities with compromised body armor, one received undocumented non-life-threatening injuries to the torso and one received
life-threatening injuries to the torso. All three fatalities were wearing a polycarbonate visor, which had been compromised causing
fatal head/facial injuries to the victim.

Of the eight survivors of accidents involving high-velocity fragmentation over the same period, seven were wearing both body
armor and visors. The remaining individual who was not wearing
any PPE had survived due to their location behind another (unprotected) victim who did not survive.9 Of the seven survivors wearing
body armor, two had their vests compromised and suffered penetrative torso injuries. Two of those who did not have their body
armor compromised still received penetrative torso wounds due to
side impact in areas not covered by their PPE, but survived these
injuries. The visors worn by seven survivors were not compromised, although three received superficial facial injuries and one
survivor lost an eye due to blast overpressure and debris entering
their visor.
While sixteen individuals is too small of a sample size to establish any statistical or causal relationship, the anecdotal information from NPA’s records indicate that ten of the sixteen individuals
involved in high-velocity fragmentation accidents were wearing
PPE, seven of whom survived with varying degrees of injuries (70
percent survival). Body armor was compromised in four out of
these ten cases (40 percent) with victims receiving injuries to the
torso, with two out of the four victims surviving those injuries (50
percent survived despite their body armor being compromised).
Visors were compromised in three out of the ten cases (30 percent)
with victims receiving injuries to the head or face; none of the victims survived these injuries. By contrast, of the six victims who
were not wearing PPE, only one survived (16 percent survival).
While the information provided from these accidents does not
take into account the method of injury and circumstances that
could be aggravating or mitigating factors (i.e., victim position,

Male NPA deminer in Bosnia and Herzegovina wearing
aramid body armor and a ballistic helmet with a
polycarbonate visor.
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fragmentation mass/density, velocity, angles, quality of casualty
evacuation (CASEVAC), etc.) or the severity of injuries and lasting disabilities, it anecdotally illustrates that personnel wearing
PPE do have higher survival rates in accidents involving highvelocity fragmentation, even if the PPE is compromised. However,
personnel who have compromised visors from high-velocity fragmentation had significantly lower survival rates. This could hypothetically be attributed to a combination of the following factors:
• Injuries to the head are much more catastrophic due to the
vulnerability of the brain, and it being a much larger proportion of the “target area” (i.e., frontal profile of the face/head),
as opposed to the torso where the chances of hitting a vital
organ are proportionately lower.
• The material properties of polycarbonate offer less protection
compared to aramid (Kevlar) by volume and weight.
• The mechanism of failure of polycarbonate visors could
potentially be a “shattering” effect, which also enables more
kinetic energy to pass through into the victim causing more
catastrophic injury. By comparison, it could be argued that
aramid fabric is able to absorb and redistribute kinetic
energy more efficiently than polycarbonate.
• Both polycarbonate and aramids are subject to degradation
due to environmental factors such as UV light, moisture, and
general wear and tear. This would begin to degrade the protective performance of these materials over time. It could be
argued that polycarbonate could deteriorate at a faster rate
due to increased exposure to the elements when compared
to aramid fabric (which is usually contained within a waterresistant pouch).

Taking these factors into consideration, it must also be noted
that the relationship between the kinetic energy of a projectile and
the severity of injuries (e.g., traumatic bone and soft tissue damage) has been extensively documented in medical journals and
other publications. According to Rozen and Dudkiewicz’s chapter
“Wound Ballistics and Tissue Damage” in Armed Conflict Injuries
to the Extremities: A Treatment Manual:10
The amount of tissue damage and the injury
severity of gunshot injuries are due to the energy
transmitted by the bullets or projectiles,
depending mainly on their velocity. Therefore,
the injuries are not divided any more, as in the
past, to ‘high- and low-velocity injury’ but to
‘a high- or low-energy injury.

This understanding is further supported by Hauer et al.:

Although a large number of factors influence
the missile in flight and after penetration of the
body, the most important factor is the amount of
energy transmitted to the tissue. Shrapnel wounds
are usually produced with similarly high kinetic
energy to those caused by hand- and long guns.
However, fragments tend to dissipate the entire
amount of energy within the body, which increases
the degree of tissue disruption.11

One of the main mechanisms through which tissue damage is
achieved is through cavitation, in which a high-energy projectile
will cause large wound cavities as a result of energy transfer. This
is further exacerbated by internal lacerations, tumbling, and fragmentation of the projectile within the victim, as well as secondary fragmentation of bone causing additional injury. According to
Rozen and Dudkiewicz, these factors are “thought to be the most
significant factor in tissue injury from high energy projectiles.”12

Rudimentary Theoretical Model of Fragmentation Impact Energy
on PPE
The mechanics through which PPE is compromised may be a
combination of factors including impact kinetic energy (a function of velocity and mass), cross-sectional density, and hardness
of the projectile as well as impact and deflection angles. In order to
develop a simplified theoretical model to study the effects of fragmentation, this paper will limit these to two factors, namely the
kinetic energy of the incoming projectile and the kinetic energy
impact resistance rating of the typical PPE material. One can therefore develop a hypothesis that if the kinetic energy of the impact
exceeds the resistance rating of the PPE material, then the probability of penetration of the PPE material will be higher.13 For further simplification, this model will assume that there is no further
fragmentation of the projectile upon impact and the hypothetical
kinetic energy passed through to the victim would be the residual
kinetic energy after the impact (kinetic energy of the impact minus
the resistance rating), thereby representing an analogue for potential severity of injury.
IMAS 10.30 lists a minimum requirement for torso protection to
be STANAG V50450 at 1.102 g, which equates to 111.78 J of impact
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kinetic energy (kinetic energy = 1/2 m v 2 .14 As such, torso protection in the HMA sector is typically comprised of aramid fabrics
(Kevlar) providing soft armor to STANAG 2920 V50450 fragmentation protection. This standard is defined as body armor stopping a
series of projectiles being launched at 450 m/s at least 50 percent of
the time.15 Bolduc and Jager further define fragmentation types and
mass, with R7 being the highest mass “right angled, circular crosssection (RCC)” projectile.” Therefore, if a soft (aramid) body armor
type is rated V50450 R7, then it is rated to stop 50 percent of unsaboted, RCC projectiles with a maximum mass of 4.15 g travelling at
450 m/s, and the theoretical impact kinetic energy (in joules) of this
projectile would be 420.185 J. By comparison, the most common
form of facial protection in compliance with IMAS 10.30 are polycarbonate full face visors that are at least 5 mm thick. According to
the technical manual of one polycarbonate manufacturer, SABIC,
their 5 mm polycarbonate sheets are rated up to 370 J of impact.16
In order to compare the differences in kinetic energy impact
of a typical piece of primary fragmentation versus secondary
fragmentation, the following formulas will be used as the basis

for calculating the velocity (V) upon impact of the respective
projectiles.
The starting velocity of primary fragmentation from a metal
bodied ordnance is determined by the respective Gurney equation17 (see Figure 1), which takes into account the body shape of the
item (spherical or cylindrical) and the velocity of detonation of the
explosive charge (dependent on explosive type).
V = initial fragment

Cylindrical Charge Equation

velocity (m/s)

(V / √2E) = ((M / C exp) + 1/2))-1/2 √2E = Gurney Constant for a
given explosive (m/s)

Spherical Charge Equation

(V / √2E) = ((M / C exp) + 3/5))-1/2

M = mass of fragment (kg)
C exp = explosive charge mass
(kg)

Figure 1. Gurney equations for cylindrical and spherical bodies.
Figure courtesy of International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, 2015.

The initial velocity calculated from a respective Gurney equation
for cylindrical or spherical bodies can then be used to further calculate the estimated velocity of a piece of fragmentation (and thus
also the energy) at a determined range as a function of air density,
cross-sectional area, drag, and fragment mass.18 This is shown in
Figure 2.
V(s) = V0 * e-(p*Cd*A*S)/(2*m)

V(s) = velocity at desired distance
V0 = velocity of the fragment at the
point

p = atmospheric density (kg) = 1.2
kg/m3 at sea level.

Cd = drag coefficient (dependent on
fragment shape)
For reference, a perfect smooth
sphere has a Cd of 0.47 at subsonic
speeds and around 1.1 at supersonic speeds while a flat plate has
a Cd of 1.28 (NASA, 1993).19 The US
Department of Defense Explosives
Safety Board recommends using a
Cd of 1.28 as an average to model
fragmentation drag of any given item
(Department of Defense, 1975). 20

A = cross sectional area of projectile
(in square meters)

S = desired distance in meters
M = mass of projectile (in kg)
Figure 2. Function of fragment velocity over distance travelled.
Figure courtesy of Federation of American Scientists.

Separately, according to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD),
the estimated approximate maximum range for secondary fragmentation is shown in Figures 3 and 4.
Rocks

Soil

29.2 / NEQ 0.4

12.5 / NEQ 0.4

Figure 3. Theoretical maximum range of projectile material type
per scale of NEQ.
Figure courtesy of U.S. Department of Defense, 1975. 21

Furthermore, simple estimates of theoretical maximum range
of fragmentation (primary and secondary) can be calculated using
the following function:
R = (V0 / g) * Sin 2θ

R = Range (m)
V0 = Initial Fragment Velocity (m/s)
g = Gravity (m/s2) (Earth gravity constant is
9.82 m/s)

θ = Launch Angle (Radians)
Figure 4. Function of fragmentation maximum theoretical range.
Figure courtesy of International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, 2015.

Using these functions, the following are illustrative examples of
fragmentation velocity and impact kinetic energy calculated for
comparisons between primary fragmentation from a BLU-26 submunition and secondary fragmentation from a PMN AP blast mine.
A BLU-26 cluster bomb has a body mass of 0.350 kg, a net
explosive quantity (NEQ) of 0.085 kg of Cyclotol, and an All Up
Weight (AUW)22 of 0.435 kg. It is generally spherical in shape
and holds 600 small steel balls of fragmentation embedded
within the metallic body. It has a diameter of 0.064 m (64 mm)
and a radius of 0.032 m. 23 Using these dimensions, the spherical
surface area of the item is 0.0128 m 2 (or 12,867 mm 2), and using
these specifications, it is possible to calculate the initial velocity
of the metal fragments at the point of detention with the spherical Gurney equation for Cyclotol as follows:
V = (((M / Cexp) + 3/5))-1/2) / √2E
V = (((0.35 / 0.085 + 0.6)) -1/2) / 2,402
V = 1,106 m/s
Although there are 600 tiny ball bearings contained within the
body, these balls are embedded in the metal itself. Therefore, we
will assume that these bits will fragment chaotically (some still
attached to the metal casting while others will be ejected cleanly).
With this in mind, we can assume that 300 spheroid pieces of fragmentation are released on average from the body, with an average
mass of 0.0011 kg (1.1 g). The average cross-sectional surface area
of each fragment will be assumed to be the overall spherical surface
area divided by 300, which gives us 0.00004 m 2 . Therefore, assuming that the item detonates 1 m away from the victim, it is possible
to calculate the estimated average velocity of each fragment at 1 m
away from the point of detonation (at sea level) using the formula
provided by the Federation of American Scientists shown here:
V(s) = V0 * e-(p*Cd*A*S)/(2*m)
V(1) = 1,106 * e-(1.2*1.28*0.00004*1)/(2*0.0011)
V(1) = 1,072.5 m/s
Thus, at 1 m from the point of detonation, the pieces of fragmentation will have an estimated velocity on average of 1,072 m/s at sea
level. Assuming that each projectile has a mass of 1.1 g, then the
kinetic energy upon impact can be estimated to be around 575 J
(0.5 * 0.0011 * 1072.52). The velocity and energy at every meter of
distance travelled can also be calculated and is shown in Figure 5.
Using this basic fragmentation model as the underlying assumption, it is estimated that during a BLU-26 accident at 1 m, a 1.1 g
fragment will impact with 575 J of kinetic energy. Assuming that 5
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mm of polycarbonate is resisBLU 26 fragment velocity over distance
BLU fragment energy over distance
tant against 370 J under per1,200
fect theoretical conditions of
1,000
impact, at least 205 J of energy
600
800
will still be retained by the
600
400
fragment once a polycarbonate
400
200
visor is comprised. Likewise,
200
assuming
that
STANAG
0
0
V50450 R7 vest can resist up to
420 J under perfect theoretical
Distance (m)
Distance (m)
conditions, the kinetic energy
Rock secondary fragmentation velocity over distance
Rock secondary energy over distance
that is retained by the fragment after a body armor vest
600
400
has been compromised would
400
be at least 155 J under perfect
200
200
conditions. Without PPE, the
0
0
victim would theoretically
suffer the impact of the entire
Distance
Distance (m)
575 J of kinetic energy from a
single fragment.
By comparison, one can also model the velocity of a 1 cm3 piece Figure 5. Graphs on the fragmentation emergency and velocity
of rock that has been ejected from a PMN blast with the following over distance.
Figure courtesy of the author.
assumptions:
1. A PMN mine has 240 g NEQ of TNT.
2. During the explosion, the entire PMN body is consumed,
Now that we have the initial velocity of the rock (calculated from
and therefore the pieces of plastic/Bakelite primary frag- theoretical maximum range), we can calculate the travelling velocmentation will be excluded.
ity at a given range. Given the assumption that the rock’s dimen3. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, 24 the average den- sions are a spheroid with a volume of 0.000001 m3, the radius (r)
sity of rock is 2.73 g per cm 3. For simplicity´s sake, we will of the spheroid rock is roughly 0.006203 m (using r = (3 * V / 4π)⅓,
assume that the volume of this rock is precisely 1 cm3 (or
calculated as 0.6203 * 0.0000011/3), and correspondingly its cross0.000001 m3) and is spheroid in shape.
sectional area, which will be the same as its circular area is 0.00012
4. The rock is launched at a 45-degree angle from the blast site.
m 2 (calculated as π*0.0062032). Using this cross-sectional area, we
A 45-degree launch angle achieves the maximum theoretical
can estimate the secondary fragmentation velocity at 0.6 m (as stiprange of any launched projectile.
Therefore, with an explosive weight of 0.24 kg of TNT in a PMN, ulated in IMAS) employing the Federation of American Scientists’
the maximum theoretical distance that a rock is ejected from a equation as follows:
V(s) = V0 * e-(p*Cd*A*S)/(2*m)
blast is (as per U.S. DOD 1975 formula):
V(0.6) = 507.47 * e-(1.2*1.28*0.00012*1)/(2*0.0027)
= 29.2 / NEQ 0.4
V(0.6) = 497 m/s
= 29.2 / 0.24 0.4
Therefore,
it is estimated that the rock will be travelling at a
= 51.67 m
Using the IATG simple fragment range estimation formula, it velocity of 497 m/s once it reaches 0.6 m (less than half the estiis possible to estimate the initial fragment velocity from a launch mated velocity of the BLU-26 fragment at 1 m). Using the 497 m/s
velocity at 0.6 m and the given mass of the rock being 2.7 g, the
angle of 45 degrees (0.785 radian).
estimated impact energy of the rock is calculated at 333.6 J (i.e., 0.5
If:
* (0.0027 * 4972)). This is within the 370 J impact rating of the 5 mm
51.67 = (V0 / g) * Sin 2θ
polycarbonate produced by SABIC and STANAG 2920 V50 450 R7
51.67 = (V0 / 9.82) * Sin (2 * 0.785)
limits for impact energy of 420 J.
Then:
Figure 5 illustrates the velocity and impact energies of BLU-26
V0 = 51.67 * 9.82 / Sin (2*0.785)
primary fragmentation and secondary fragmentation from a PMN
V0 = 507.47 m/s
blast. In addition to PPE playing a significant factor in mitigating
the transfer of kinetic energy, the standoff distance plays a significant factor as well. Projectiles rapidly decelerate, thereby also losing impact kinetic energy in the process.

Material Degradation of PPE and Environmental Impact of Disposal
Taking these scenarios into consideration, one can argue that
the condition of the PPE can potentially affect its tensile strength,
thereby decreasing its ability to absorb kinetic energy and enabling
a higher probability of penetration by both primary and secondary fragmentation. The decreased level of protection offered by the
degraded material would in turn permit more kinetic energy to
pass through to the wearer. The degradation of both polycarbonate
and Kevlar due to use and environmental factors has been extensively documented.
In the case of polycarbonate, exposure to ultraviolet (UV)
light has been one of the main causes of material degradation.25
Significant yellowing occurs to the material and the polycarbonate loses its strength and elasticity. The mechanical properties of
polycarbonate also change, becoming more brittle and crystalline.
Under laboratory conditions, untreated polycarbonate begins to
yellow within seventy-two hours of UV exposure and significantly
yellows by 503 hours of UV exposure.26 Assuming that a polycarbonate visor is exposed to sunlight eight hours a day in field conditions, this would be the equivalent of 62.88 work days. Tensile
strength decreases by 9 percent within 216 hours of UV exposure.
This degradation means that polycarbonate visors lose their protective properties after continuous operational use, thereby gradually losing their ability to offer the level of protection specified in
IMAS 10.30.
During regular operational/field usage, visors also accumulate
scratches and other wear and tear, thereby further compromising
the structural integrity. Additionally, the combination of scratches
and yellowing of visors further adds to the diminishing of visibility
for the user. IMAS Technical Note 10.10/0227 states that
Users should be aware that the polycarbonate
material from which blast-visors are made
is adversely affected by prolonged exposure
to sunlight (UV light). The effect of sunlight is
to create hardened areas from which a
crack may propagate.

It further goes on to report instances where visors have shattered
as a result of AP mine blasts, exacerbating the injuries received by
victims. Even in cases where polycarbonate is only used in a relatively limited capacity such as in ROFI’s demining mask (the mask
is primarily made from laminated composite materials with a polycarbonate vision slot), the use of polycarbonate presents a potential
“single point failure” scenario.
A test of a new mask in 2008 by the Swedish Rescue Services
Agency conducted on 240 g of TNT equivalent placed on the surface on sand with a 70-degree blast angle at 55 cm showed that the
polycarbonate vision slot of the mask shattered while the rest of
the mask was not compromised during the blast.28 A similar test
done on 140 g of TNT equivalent showed both the polycarbonate
vision slot and the composite components of the mask withstanding the blast. According to ROFI, an internal test with the blast
of a PMA-1A (presumably containing the standard 200 g of TNT)

at 55 cm showed that the mask withstood the blast without being
compromised (ROFI).29
Aramid fabrics such as Kevlar used in body armor also suffer
from degradation due to continual use. In particular, degradation as a result of long-term exposure to moisture and mechanical
ablation from friction has been documented. According to Forster
et al., p-phenylene terephthalamides (PPTA) body armor such as
Kevlar and Twaron had a theoretical 10–13 percent decrease in V50
rating resistance after artificial aging simulating the temperature,
humidity, and mechanical wear of typical field use over five years. 30
Likewise, Grant et al. reported a 10 percent reduction in V50 ballistic performance of five-year-old, United States National Institute
of Justice (NIJ) Level IIIA and Level II body armor taken from a
random sample of field users. 31 Direct exposure of aramids such as
Kevlar and Twaron to the natural elements conducted in hot and
humid environments have reported up to an 80 percent decrease
in tensile strength.32 Possible explanations for this include water
and other liquid ingress causing the “slippage of yarns of aramid
fabric in wet conditions,”33 as well as mechanical wearing of the
fibers caused by repeated folding and rolling34 simulating conditions worn in the field.
As a result of degradation, body armor manufacturers typically provide a five-year warranty and it is recommended that
users replace the body armor every five years of regular use or
the period recommended by the manufacturer.35 IMAS Technical
Note 10.10/02 also recommends that “visors manufactured from
untreated polycarbonate are replaced annually or every 225 days of
use in order to minimise risks of degraded protection as a result of
UV exposure.”36 Taking this into consideration, environmentallysound methods of disposal employed by HMA operators may not
typically be available in countries that they work in.
Kevlar in its final form is very hard to destroy and will not
naturally decompose in a landfill. Although there exists various
energy and capital-intensive recycling methods such as chemical
and thermal breakdown (pyrolysis) of the materials, it is not yet at
a stage to be economically viable.37 Relatively new methods such as
thermal degradation, as proposed by Dabkiewicz et al., have yet to
be fully commercialized.38 Although there are various companies
that specialize in the recycling of Kevlar, these companies are not
present in many developing countries where mine action operators normally work. Shipping unserviceable Kevlar internationally
will also likely not be cost-effective, particularly for humanitarian
organizations.
As stated previously, visors have a relatively short service life and
polycarbonate material is not as easily recyclable as other plastics
such as polyethylene. Polycarbonate is typically recycled through
thermal and chemical processes that break down and reconstitute the material. As it is for recycling Kevlar, the processes for
recycling polycarbonate are not readily available in most of the
countries where HMA is being conducted due to its technical and
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Male NPA deminers in South Sudan wearing
aramid body armor and polycarbonate visors.
capital-intensive nature. As a plastic polymer, polycarbonate does
not naturally bio-degrade in landfills and particulate shedding
can occur which can further add to microplastic pollution. For
example, Zhang et al., 39 estimate that 310 t of microplastic polycarbonate enter water systems annually in the form of sewage sludge
in the United States. Polycarbonate waste has been documented
to leach a precursor additive compound bisphenol A (BPA) into
water sources. Although longitudinal public health implications
have yet to be studied, evidence presented by Konieczna et al.,40
suggests a strong relationship between prolonged BPA exposure
and endocrine disorders in humans. According to Morin et al.,41
“BPA is commonly found in landfill leachate at levels exceeding
acute toxicity benchmarks” and in Norway it was reported that
concentrations of 188 mg +-125 mg of BPA leachate was present in
every 1 kg of solid plastic waste.42 To the author’s knowledge, there
have not yet been any definitive studies on the proportion of polycarbonate in overall global plastic waste and the extent to which
this has caused environmental damage in developing countries
(particularly mine and explosive remnants of war [ERW]-affected
countries) is unreported.
Taking all of this into consideration, HMA operators can potentially release several tonnes of polycarbonate and aramid waste
every few years due to the need for replacement of visors and body
armor. If for example a mine action operator deploys 1,000 deminers wearing full face polycarbonate visors and body armor in a
country program, then the operator may be expected to discard up
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to 1,000 visors every year if it complies to IMAS 10.10/02 recommendations and up to 1,000 kits of body armor every five years.
With a typical standard full-face visor from a manufacturer such
as Security Devices weighing around 1 kg and body armor (i.e.,
Apron) weighing between 2.5 and 3.9 kg,43 this would equate to
1 t of polycarbonate waste produced every year and 2.5–3.9 t of
aramid waste produced every five years by that operator’s country
program alone.
For perspective, NPA employs 1,441 mine action operational
staff globally as of September 2021. From anecdotal reports, mine
action operators typically put unserviceable PPE into long-term
storage, however it is not immediately clear what will happen
thereafter and what the end-of-life cycle process of this waste disposal will be. If for instance the items are discarded in local landfills, the environmental concerns as highlighted previously may be
particularly acute. Likewise, if the items are incinerated, there will
likely be significant carbon emissions and particulate air pollution.
There are also ethical concerns regarding the practice of international operators donating unserviceable or expired PPE to national
operators and national authorities, particularly if the materials
have degraded to such an extent as to offer decreased protection
below national standards and/or IMAS 10.30. It can also be the
case that operators may not know when and why PPE needs to be
replaced, thereby continuing the use of degraded or unserviceable
PPE in the field and adding unnecessary risks.

Gendered Perspectives on Comfort and Ergonomics
While the technical drawbacks and limitations in the appropriateness, use, and disposal of PPE have been explored throughout
this paper, it is also important to factor in the comfort level of PPE
for the wearer, to further enable a safer and more productive work
environment. As stated previously, although there are commercially available products that can provide increased protection, this
comes at a significant penalty in weight, bulk, and discomfort for
the wearer (not considering cost). Although there have been technological developments in body armor such as the increased use of
ultra-high molecular weight polyethylene (UHMWPE) and innovative facial protection systems that use composite materials combined with reduced use of polycarbonate such as ROFI’s demining
masks, widespread adoption has been relatively limited.
Furthermore, just as threats and protective technologies change
over time, so too has the face of mine action. Whereas in the past,
mine action operations (particularly demining and EOD) have
been almost exclusively conducted by men, there is now greater
participation of women both as operational staff and as leaders.
According to IMAS 10.30, “PPE provided shall fit the employee,
male or female, and be designed to provide reasonable comfort
and protection against the predictable risks present at a demining worksite. Cultural practices should also be taken into consideration.”44 Unfortunately, almost all PPE used in the HMA sector
is unisex and not optimized toward female wearers. This causes

discomfort and potentially reduces the safety of the equipment
and the wearer’s operational efficiency. Although female-specific
body armor is now commonly used in the law enforcement sector
around the world, these developments have not yet been adopted
within the mine action sector. Unisex body armors are typically
designed according to the size, body shape, and/or proportions of
men; however, when issued to women, the only difference is that
they are issued in smaller sizes.
For this reason, the author hypothesizes that the current generation of PPE may not provide the full coverage, comfort, or functionality for women when compared to men. One of the first activities
encompassed in the Innovation Norway grant is to develop and
field next generation PPE. With this in mind, NPA conducted an
internal global survey of 340 participants working in field operations; 65.6 percent of whom were women. In total, 83.8 percent of
respondents worked as a deminer or team leader. Highlights from
the preliminary results showed that:
•
•

•

•
•

•

•
•

•
•
•

13.53 percent of respondents reported their body armor

as being overall uncomfortable or very uncomfortable
25 percent of respondents reported some form of
abdominal pain or discomfort while wearing body
armor
25.89 percent of respondents reported reported their
visors as being overall uncomfortable or very uncomfortable
25.89 percent of respondents reported some form of hip
pain or discomfort while wearing body armor
26.47 percent of respondents reported some form of
genital/groin pain or discomfort while wearing body
armor
27.36 percent of respondents reported some form of
inner thigh pain or discomfort while wearing body
armor
27.65 percent of respondents reported some form of
breast pain or discomfort while wearing body armor
34.11 percent of respondents reported some form of
lower back pain or discomfort while wearing body
armor
39.70 percent of respondents reported some form of difficulty breathing while wearing visors
41.76 percent of respondents reported some form of
shoulder pain or discomfort while wearing body armor
48.23 percent of respondents had some form of head or
neck pain while wearing visors

Female NPA deminer in Tajikistan
conducting clearance in difficult
terrain while wearing aramid body
armor and a demining mask.

These preliminary results appear to be consistent with the initial assumption that improvements in ergonomics are necessary,
particularly as it relates to women. In addition to the various cultural taboos in developing and post-conflict countries for women
in what was traditionally seen as male-dominated work, the lack
of ergonomic optimization of PPE for women may also be a factor
in creating further barriers to female participation in the mine
action sector.
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Conclusion and Prospective Innovations
Through analysis of casualties from high-velocity fragmentation, analyzing the kinetic energy impact of fragmentation, and
conducting a literature review on the degradation of polycarbonate
and aramids, the existing evidence appears to suggest that any new
developments in PPE should minimize or completely forego the
use of polycarbonate for visors, and at the very least pursue ways
to better seal aramid materials against the elements. This would
enable more consistent levels of IMAS 10.30 compliant V50 450
protection of both body armor and visors. Further exploration
is also needed on finding ways to improve protection beyond the
level stipulated in IMAS 10.30, particularly against high-velocity
fragmentation, without increasing weight and bulk or reducing
visibility. Careful consideration will also be needed to ensure the
environmentally sustainable disposal of expired or unserviceable
PPE and/or ways to prolong the service life of existing serviceable
stocks. As of this writing, NPA is conducting further studies to
determine the life-cycle management of PPE in its country programs. Underlying all of this is the cross-cutting theme that any
development and advancement in PPE must be gender-sensitive
and take into account user feedback on comfort, mobility, and
visibility, particularly from female users. It must also be noted,
as argued by Smith, that cost will always be a factor in enabling
widespread adoption, therefore any new solutions proposed must
be cost-effective and on par with the cost of replenishing current
generation PPE.
In support of these conclusions, NPA will be pursuing the following lines of inquiry:
• Explore the incorporation of composite materials and new
designs of visors that minimize the use of polycarbonate.
Transparent materials in lieu of polycarbonate, treatments
of polycarbonate, or a combination thereof will be also
explored. One of the possibilities is to further optimize the
demining mask design (or similar designs) to enable better

visibility, breathability, and protection at a cost on par with
untreated polycarbonate visors.
• Explore portable low-cost solutions that can enable the safe
destruction or recycling of unserviceable polycarbonate and
aramids with the least environmental impact. These solutions must be implementable in austere environments.
• Explore the use of ballistic fabrics that are more environmentally and mechanically resistant to wear and tear than
aramid, develop better protective shells for current aramid
PPE in service, and/or explore composite designs that offer
the same levels of mobility and flexibility of aramid.
• Conduct focus groups on how to best optimize and modularize PPE designs so that they can be more adaptable to female
users.
NPA will subsequently be having a market dialogue wherein an
open invitation will be announced for all companies and organizations interested in partnering with NPA under this Innovation
Norway project in order to find potential solutions and jointly
develop and field test scalable prototypes.
See endnotes page ##
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